From: Mohamed Lodhi [mailto:
lodhi@swipnet.se]
Sent: 03 January 2015 07:12
To: Mohamed Lodhi
Subject: FW: Speller's An Africa Cuba
Zanzibar – A victim of Cold War or US-UK Conspiracy ?
An African Cuba? Britain and the Zanzibar Revolution, 1964.
This article examines the response of the British government to the revolution in Zanzibar
Zanzibar
in January 1964. It demonstrates that, once the safety of British
nationals had been assured, British concerns centred upon the
possibility that the new regime in Zanzibar might become susceptible to
communist influence. These fears appeared to be realised as British
influence in Zanzibar diminished and the new government welcomed
communist aid and advisers. In the aftermath of successful military
interventions in support of moderate regimes in Kenya, Uganda and
Tanganyika, and under pressure from Washington to take decisive action,
the British prepared a series of plans for military action in Zanzibar.
None of these were enacted and the final plan was srapped in December.
The
paper examines the range of factors that undermined British diplomacy
and inhibited the government from taking military action in Zanzibar. In
doing so it illustrates the complexity of Britain’s relationship with
postcolonial regimes in East Africa and the difficulties that it faced
when trying to exert influence in a region recognised by both London and
Washington as a British sphere of influence.
An African Cuba? Britain and the Zanzibar Revolution, 1964.
This article examines the response of the British government to the revolution in
Zanzibar in January 1964. It demonstrates that, once the safety of British nationals
had been assured, British concerns centred upon the possibility that the new regime
in Zanzibar might become susceptible to communist influence. These fears appeared
to be realised as British influence in Zanzibar diminished and the new government
welcomed communist aid and advisers. In the aftermath of successful military
interventions in support of moderate regimes in Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika, and
under pressure from Washington to take decisive action, the British prepared a series
of plans for military action in Zanzibar. None of these were enacted and the final plan
was scrapped in December. The paper examines the range of factors that undermined
British diplomacy and inhibited the government from taking military action in
Zanzibar. In doing so it illustrates the complexity of Britain’s relationship with postcolonial
regimes in East Africa and the difficulties that it faced when trying to exert
influence in a region recognised by both London and Washington as a British sphere
of influence.
On 10 December 1963 the Sultanate of Zanzibar achieved independence from British
rule. One month later, on 12 January 1964, the elected government was overthrown
and the Sultan deposed in a violent revolution. This act reversed two hundred years of
Arab dominance of the political and economic life of Zanzibar and ensured that,
contrary to British policy during colonial rule, the islands would be primarily African
in nature rather than Arab. The revolution replaced a conservative Arab-dominated
regime with one that espoused the principles of African nationalism and radical
socialism and that developed close ties with communist bloc countries. As the former
colonial power Britain had an interest in events in Zanzibar, not least because of the
presence there of numerous British nationals many of whom had worked for the
deposed regime. In the absence of any major strategic or economic interest in
Zanzibar itself, British concerns centred on the fear that the islands would become
susceptible to communist influence and could act as a destabilising influence off the
coast of East Africa. There was a fear that Zanzibar could become an ‘African Cuba’,
1
an analogy that was used a number of times by British officials. Apparently unable to
check the spread of communist influence through conventional diplomatic means the
British developed a variety of plans for military intervention although, in the event,
none of these plans were enacted. The British response was conditioned by Cold War
thinking but British policy makers were wary about using military force without
appropriate international support.
The revolution in Zanzibar has been somewhat overlooked by historians of
British foreign and defence policy. Phillip Darby gives the crisis only a passing
mention in his study of British defence policy east of Suez. 1 Jeffrey Pickering makes
no reference to the revolution in his study of Britain’s withdrawal from the region
while Saki Dockrill’s one mention of Zanzibar mistakenly states that British troops
were used there to assist in putting down a mutiny in the army.2 James Cable refers to
the limited evacuations conducted by British and US Ships in January 1964 as an
example of ‘definitive force’ but does not develop Zanzibar as a case study in his
work on gunboat diplomacy.3 Accounts that focus specifically on the revolution have
concentrated on events in Zanzibar and do not examine British policy in the days and
months after the rising.4 The numerous histories of British policy in Africa at this
time focus their inquiries into East Africa on the mainland states of Kenya, Uganda
and Tanganyika. Zanzibar receives rather less coverage.5
It is evident that the British response to the revolution in Zanzibar has received
little attention from historians. That this is the case is not particularly surprising.
British concerns in Zanzibar were dwarfed by those in its mainland neighbours, not
least due to the presence in the latter of a white settler community that did not exist in
2
Zanzibar. Similarly, the British desire to retain military bases and staging facilities in
Kenya provided a strategic interest to their policy there. Such factors were absent in
the case of Zanzibar. The British had no significant economic interest in the islands.
The revolution and its aftermath did not receive anything like the same attention in
Cabinet, Parliament or the newspapers that was gained by the ongoing crisis in
Southern Rhodesia. Zanzibar was not the most serious challenge facing British policy
overseas. Indeed, and in contrast to the mainland where, in 1964, British troops were
employed in support of the governments of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika, the
British government was never sufficiently concerned about developments in Zanzibar
to order military intervention. Despite this, an examination of the British response to
the revolution is instructive in a number of ways. It provides a valuable insight into
the range of factors that influenced British policy in post-colonial East Africa. It
demonstrates the way in which local and regional considerations influenced British
policy. The various plans for military intervention illustrate the constraints and
limitations and also the opportunities associated with the use of military force in
circumstances short of war at a time when British defence policy was explicitly
expeditionary in focus. It also helps to explain why, despite the presence within the
region of powerful British forces and despite pressure from Washington to act and an
explicit promise of diplomatic support from President Johnson, the British chose not
to intervene in Zanzibar.
I
Zanzibar consists of two main islands, Unguja and Pemba, and a number of small
adjacent islands. Unguja was larger and more developed than Pemba and became a
3
focus for radical politics in a way that the smaller island did not. The population
consisted of a majority African community with sizeable Arab and Asian minorities.
The Arab community had dominated the political and economic life of the islands
since the eighteenth century. In 1890 the British instituted a protectorate agreement
with the ruling Sultan. Although only responsible originally for foreign affairs, the
British soon began to dominate political life. In 1896, in a classic example of ‘gunboat
diplomacy’, a pro-British candidate was installed as Sultan after a brief bombardment
by the Royal Navy. The de facto status of colony was confirmed in 1913 when
responsibility for the protectorate was transferred from the Foreign Office to the
Colonial Office and a British Resident replaced the Consul General.6 Despite
undertaking measures to end the practice of slavery British rule enabled the Arab
minority to preserve its dominant political status over the African majority.
However, as with other examples of ‘colonialism’s founding alliances’, such
as the relationship with the Buganda kingdom in Uganda, the basis of British rule in
Zanzibar provided an unreliable mechanism for long-term stability.7 Prior to the 1964
revolution there were roughly 50,000 Arabs resident in Zanzibar compared to 230,000
‘mainland’ Africans and ‘indigenous’ Shirazis.8 There was also a community of
around 20,000 Asians.9 Land, wealth and political power remained concentrated in
Arab hands, although the Asian community was prominent in business and trade. The
fact that serious social-economic discrepancies existed between different ethnic
groups led to the race/class division within society becoming the key political issue.
In the 1950s the British had considered applying to Zanzibar the same kind of multiracial
‘partnership’ ideas then being considered as a means of reconciling the interests
of the diverse ethnic groups on the mainland. They were frustrated in this by Arab
4
opposition. Arab nationalists apparently saw no need for such measures.10 Arab
confidence in their ability to maintain a hold on power after independence appeared
well-founded. Despite significant historic, economic, cultural and social ties to
neighbouring Tanganyika, and in contrast to the experience of most Indian princes in
the 1940s or of the Buganda in newly independent Uganda, the Sultan’s government
was not forced to accept a loss of sovereignty or accession into a larger political
unit.11 In the pre-independence elections of July 1963 the Arab dominated Zanzibar
National Party and their allies in the Zanzibar and Pemba People’s Party12 gained a
slender majority of seats. The African dominated Afro-Shirazi Party polled over 54
per cent of the vote but, due to the arrangement of constituencies, gained only 13 out
of the 31 seats in the National Assembly. The radical left-wing Umma party, formed
just before the election, did not field any candidates.
For many Africans the election results appeared to rule out constitutional
means of addressing the existing social, political and economic imbalances within
Zanzibar society and stood in contrast to the movement towards Uhuru (freedom) in
mainland East Africa. In the aftermath of independence the government exacerbated
ill feeling by initiating legislation designed to limit the activities of the press and
opposition groups and to replace existing members of the police and bureaucracy with
personnel known to support the party. Notably, African police officers of mainland
origin were dismissed. Rather foolishly, the government dismissed the policemen but
as a cost cutting measure it did not pay for their immediate repatriation. This left in
Zanzibar a group of men with paramilitary training, an intimate knowledge of police
procedures and a grievance against the government.13 In the short-term these
measures weakened the police which, in the absence of national armed forces or
5
British troops, was the only security force available to the government. In November
1963 the government had sought to bolster its position by requesting a defence
agreement with the British to cater for the provision of troops up to battalion strength
for internal security duties. The British refused the request, noting that it would be
inappropriate for British troops to be employed in the maintenance of law and order
once authority had been transferred. The Zanzibar government was reassured that in
the event of any external aggression there would be ‘immediate consultations’ to
consider what assistance could be provided.14 It is noteworthy that the British refused
this request despite intelligence reports that suggested that there might be disturbances
after independence and that there could be an increase in communist activity in
Zanzibar. There was recognition that the presence of British troops, far from helping
the situation, might enflame African nationalist sentiment and actually undermine
rather than support British interests.15
The revolution began at around 0300 on 12 January 1964. The exact details of
the planning and conduct of the uprising are difficult to discern with any accuracy.
The official account of the revolution, published on the first anniversary, claims that
the operation was planned and led by the leader of the Afro-Shirazi Party, Abeid
Karume.16 This is almost certainly untrue. Planning seems to have involved radical
members of the Afro-Shirazi Youth League in association with a Ugandan called John
Okello.
While it may be difficult to be precise about the planning of the revolution, the
outcome is easier to determine. A group of around 800 ill-armed rebels attacked and
seized the police stations and armouries on Unguja, before advancing into Zanzibar
6
Town to seize the government buildings and the Sultan’s Palace in the Stonetown
area. The Sultan and many senior government officials fled the scene and escaped in
the Sultan’s yacht, the Seyyid Khalifa.17 The revolution was accompanied by violence
directed against the Arab community and an unknown number of people were killed
or beaten. There were many rapes. Arab and Asian property was also attacked. The
death toll probably ran into thousands and the majority of victims were Arabs.18 On
the explicit instructions of Okello, Europeans were not attacked.
With the fall of the government a Revolutionary Council was established with
Karume as President of the People’s Republic of Zanzibar and Pemba and the leader
of Umma, Abdulrahman Mohamed Babu, as Minister of External Affairs. Okello did
not try to remain in overall control, contenting himself with the title of Field Marshal.
Neither Karume nor Babu had been directly involved in the activities of 12 January.
Karume was taken to the mainland temporarily ‘for safe keeping’ by Okello’s men
once violence had broken out. Similarly, Babu was in Dar es Salaam prior to the
revolution and was not involved in planning the rising.19 However, the presence in
Zanzibar immediately after the revolution of Umma supporters trained in Cuba and
wearing Cuban combat fatigues and, apparently, some Fidel Castro style beards, gave
rise to the erroneous belief that the revolution was a Cuban style communist takeover.
This explanation fitted British and American preconceptions, giving rise to fear
that Zanzibar might become ‘an African Cuba under communist control’.20
II
7
British forces in Kenya were informed of the revolution at 0445 on 12 January and
troops and aircraft in Kenya were placed on 15 minutes standby to be ready to
conduct an ‘airfield assault’. In the event, military action was not required. The
British High Commissioner in Zanzibar, Timothy Crosthwait, reported that there were
no reports of British nationals being attacked. He did not support the use of British
troops on their own and believed that ‘Africans should help their brothers’. This was
an interesting choice of words given that this was essentially a revolt by Africans
against their Arab rulers. The outgoing Zanzibar government had in fact appealed to
Kenya and Tanganyika for help, but to no avail. Later that evening British troops held
at immediate notice to move were reduced to four hours notice. It was recognised that
the revolutionaries were now in effective control of the island. 21 The chance to
support the government in defeating the revolution had been allowed to pass.
The most obvious and immediate concern for British officials was the safety
of the 400 British nationals and numerous other Europeans and Americans currently
resident in Zanzibar. Within hours of the outbreak of revolution the United States
Ambassador had announced his intention to evacuate American nationals from
Zanzibar.22 The British approach was rather different. They were concerned that a
premature evacuation might destabilise the situation in Zanzibar. Many Europeans
held important technical jobs and their departure might undermine economic life and
the provision of key public services. The British were also keen to ensure that any
evacuation should be conducted with the concurrence of the revolutionary
government to minimise the potential for bloodshed.23 American personnel were
evacuated by the destroyer USS Manley on 13 January. This was without the prior
agreement of the Revolutionary Council and the evacuation was delayed by armed
8
men until the Council eventually granted permission for it to proceed. British
officials felt that this ‘precipitate action’ had created much ill-will in Zanzibar.24
The first and most visible British response to the revolution was provided by
the Royal Navy. HMS Owen, a survey vessel, arrived in the evening of 12 January
having been diverted from survey work off the coast of Kenya. It was joined on 15
January by the frigate HMS Rhyl and the auxiliary ship RFA Hebe. The pacific nature
of HMS Owen (survey ships did not have any main armament) may have made its
presence more acceptable to the revolutionaries. Certainly its complement of boats,
necessary for survey work, proved useful for conveying personnel from ship to shore
and would have proven vital in any major evacuation. The more warlike nature of
HMS Rhyl was exacerbated by the fact that ‘A’ Company of the 1st Battalion of the
Staffordshire Regiment had been embarked due to an inaccurate intelligence report
that a ‘serious situation’ was due to arise in Zanzibar on 15 January.25 Embarkation of
the troops had been reported in the Kenyan media and the fact that they were known
to be on their way was a cause of some embarrassment to Crosthwait in his dealings
with the new government. To make matters worse, by chance Hebe had just
completed the de-storing of the Royal Navy Armaments Depot at Mombassa and was
full of weapons and explosives. Fortunately this fact was kept quiet in Zanzibar
although, by refusing to be searched, the ship’s presence did cause suspicion ashore.
There was speculation that the vessel was some form of amphibious ship.26 The
original task given to HMS Owen had been to protect and, if need be, evacuate British
subjects living in Zanzibar. Owen’s commanding officer, Commander Haslam had
instructions ‘not to interfere in any other way’. All three British ships participated in a
partial evacuation of personnel on 17 January and the requirement to protect
9
remaining British and European civilians remained a key aspect of British military
planning in the months ahead.27
Unguja is only 25 miles (40 km) off the coast of Tanganyika and historically
Zanzibar had had close links to the mainland. The accession of an African dominated
government in the islands increased the possibility of cooperation with the other ex-
British colonies in East Africa and the governments of Kenya, Uganda and
Tanganyika displayed an interest in supporting stability in Zanzibar. In response to a
request from Karume, President Nyerere of Tanganyika sent 300 Tanganyikan
policemen to Zanzibar to help restore order. These men went someway towards
strengthening the position of the government there. Unfortunately the political
situation on the mainland was soon to deteriorate. On 20 January the Tanganyika
Rifles mutinied. The mutiny appears to have been prompted by frustration at the slow
pace of the Africanisation of the army and by a demand for better pay. The mutineers
may have been encouraged by the success of the ‘African’ revolution in Zanzibar and
the temporary absence of such a large contingent of policemen. This action was
followed by similar unrest in both Kenya and Uganda. This threatened to undermine
the British position in East Africa which was based upon supporting the moderate
regimes to whom they had recently handed over power. The British were thus faced
with a crisis in their former East African colonies that extended far beyond
Zanzibar.28 Some observers were quick to draw a connection between events in
Zanzibar and instability on the mainland.29
Unlike the Zanzibar revolution the East African mutinies directly threatened
important British interests and the military response was rapid and effective. HMS
10
Rhyl, with its troops still embarked, immediately sailed to Tanganyika to be available
to conduct an amphibious landing should the need arise and was replaced off Zanzibar
by HMS Owen with a company of Gordon Highlanders onboard. Meanwhile, No. 45
Commando, Royal Marines was embarked in the aircraft carrier HMS Centaur at
Aden and sailed to Tanganyika via Mombassa, joining the destroyer HMS Cambrian
en route. On 24 January the British received a request for military assistance from
President Nyerere and as a result No.45 Commando undertook a helicopter landing at
dawn the next day near the main rebel barracks at Colito, outside Dar es Salaam.
Accompanied by a firepower demonstration by the guns of HMS Cambrian, the
landing was a success and secured the barracks with minimum loss of African lives
and no British casualties. Subsequent operations disarmed rather acquiescent
mutineers at Tabora and Nachingweya and order was restored throughout the
country.30 No.45 Commando was later relieved by No.41 Commando, Royal Marines
before these in turn were replaced by Nigerian troops. British forces left the country
amid plaudits from the local press and with the grateful thanks of the Tanganyikan
government.31 The mutiny in Tanganyika sparked similar unrest in the Ugandan and
Kenyan armies. Both countries had to seek help from their erstwhile colonial master
and British troops from Kenya were used to restore order and disarm the mutineers.
British military intervention in East Africa was effective, but it was also rather
embarrassing. President Nyerere convened a special meeting of the Organisation of
African Unity to explain his reasons for calling in British troops and to call for
African soldiers to replace them.32 The British were very aware of the danger of being
seen to interfere in the internal affairs of their former colonies. The landing in
Tanganyika only occurred after a direct request by the President and this was also the
11
case in both Uganda and Kenya. London only agreed to meet the first request for
assistance, from Ugandan Prime Minister Milton Obote, on condition that he put the
request in writing and issued a public broadcast.33 All parties recognised the value of
replacing British forces in Tanganyika with African troops before the favourable
reception they had initially received could turn sour. Both No.45 and No.41
Commandos received a warm welcome in that country but the latter noted that
opposition to their presence had begun to grow before their departure in April.34 This
served to reinforce the government’s preference not to maintain British forces in
African countries for internal security purposes after independence.35
III
The successful interventions on the East African mainland were followed by a series
of plans for British military action in Zanzibar. These were not designed to secure any
vital interest in Zanzibar itself. In a brief prepared in February for the Defence and
Overseas Policy Committee (DOPC) and approved by Commonwealth Relations
Office and Ministry of Defence officials it was noted that British commercial interests
in Zanzibar were ‘minute’ and that Zanzibar was ‘not important’ by itself. It could,
however, ‘in communist hands’, become a dangerous centre for the smuggling of
agents, arms and propaganda into East Africa, an area where direct financial and
strategic interests were at stake.36 Thus, while the DOPC advised that ‘there were no
substantial British interests in Zanzibar itself’ there was some concern within
government and on the backbenches about the possibility of Zanzibar destabilising its
neighbours.37
12
The activities on the mainland had apparently shown how trouble in one
country could spark problems elsewhere. They had also brought to the region a
concentration of British military assets including the aircraft carriers HMS Centaur
and Victorious. The new regime in Zanzibar had gained rapid recognition from its
mainland neighbours and from a number of communist countries including China, the
Soviet Union and East Germany. Britain, in common with the United States and most
Commonwealth countries, withheld such recognition until 23 February.38 This delay
was a cause of much embarrassment to Crosthwait and he believed that it was one
reason why western influence was so quickly eclipsed by communist interests in
Zanzibar. On 20 February he and his staff were expelled from the islands, only
returning on 5 March after recognition had been granted.39 The Secretary of State for
Commonwealth Relations, Duncan Sandys, had explained to Parliament that the
reasons for this delay were due to the confused situation that existed in Zanzibar and
the need to consult first with other Commonwealth countries. In his valedictory
despatch, written in July, Crosthwait identified another reason for the delay. He noted
that, in the wake of the successful interventions on the mainland, it had been hoped
that ‘events might make possible’ similar action in Zanzibar.40 Indeed, on 29 January
Sandys had requested that he try to think how a ‘plausible excuse’ could be obtained
for intervention.41
Once the safety of their own citizens had been secured by the evacuation of 15
January, the United States recognised British primacy over Zanzibar. The
governments on both sides of the Atlantic saw East Africa as a British sphere of
influence. The American Ambassador in Dar es Salaam recommended that
Washington should urge the British to persuade East African governments to co-
13
operate with them in restoring order in Zanzibar. The State Department sympathised
with this position and on 29 January the Under Secretary of State, Averill Harriman,
sent a cable to the ambassador in London suggesting that the British should extract a
request from Karume for military support to shore up his position. American
interpretations were conditioned by their Cold War outlook. There was a fear that
instability could lead to a communist take-over, and that this would turn Zanzibar into
a base for subversive and insurgency operations against the mainland, somewhat akin
to the role that they believed Cuba fulfilled in Latin America.42 On 1 February the
American Ambassador in London informed Sandys that President Johnson had
personally agreed that the United States would give public and diplomatic support to
any British intervention.43 Four days later the President sent a direct message to the
Prime Minister. He suggested that the time to act had arrived and that only the British
government had the ‘necessary position and influence in Zanzibar and in the nearby
African States’.44
The American government had been impressed by the successful British
interventions on the mainland in late January. However, as the months passed and as
Karume’s government appeared to fall increasingly under the spell of Soviet, East
German and Chinese advisers, the State Department become a little disillusioned at
Britain’s failure to take similarly decisive action in the case of Zanzibar. In a message
to the British Foreign Secretary on 30 March the United States Secretary of State,
Dean Rusk, urged the British to impress on Karume and the mainland governments
the dire consequences of a communist take-over in Zanzibar. He concluded the
message with the statement that ‘...we must act without delay with whatever means
are necessary to reverse the totally unsatisfactory situation in Zanzibar.’45 Johnson
14
reinforced this point in a message to the Prime Minister the same day. Once again he
affirmed that due to ‘your history and your resources’ Britain had to take the lead in
East Africa and that the United States would ‘support you in every way possible in
any decision to reverse the present course of events in Zanzibar’.46 The British were
not being given a blank cheque over Zanzibar, there was no suggestion of US forces
participating in any military activity, but they could clearly count on political support
from the United States should they decide to intervene.
For some time it was difficult to ascertain exactly who was in charge in
Zanzibar. It was recognised that the Afro-Shirazi Party and Umma shared power in
the new government, with the leaders of both parties as President and Minister of
External Affairs respectively. It was also recognised, however, that Okello retained
considerable power through the allegiance of a large number of armed irregulars
calling themselves the Freedom Military Force. It was unclear to what extent the
interests of the government and of Okello coincided. Karume was regarded as
something of a moderate socialist and a man with whom the British could do
business. Babu was recognised to hold radical left-wing views and was initially
thought to be the ‘brain behind the revolt’.47 The British sought to work with the
government rather than with the Field Marshal. Okello was an unknown quantity to
the British and Americans. He was assessed as being of Ugandan or Kenyan descent
and was believed to have once worked as a policeman on Pemba. Commander Haslam
believed that he had once been a Mau Mau leader, a factor unlikely to make him
popular with the former colonial power.48 It was believed that he and many of his
supporters had been communist trained, although in fact this was not the case. What
was clear was that the existence of hundreds of armed supporters made Okello a
15
power to be reckoned with in Zanzibar. The British were fearful that he might launch
another coup to remove Karume and had been particularly concerned when the
President left Zanzibar on 16 January to go to Tanganyika to request assistance in
restoring order.49
Having identified Karume as a moderate British plans emphasised a
requirement to support him in power. Unfortunately it was recognised that he might
not want such support. Crosthwait believed that Karume would resent the interference
of ‘white men in Black affairs’. He also noted that such support could be
counterproductive, drawing an analogy with American interference in Cuba,
informing London that;
Karume’s appeal in Zanzibar rests upon his Africanism and his freedom of
‘colonialist’ taint. Any British action to bolster him would at once discredit
him and undermine position of moderates who are trying to get his ear. With
their Cuban backgrounds, Marxist extremists would at once draw parallels
with Bay of Pigs.50
Despite these fears some consideration was given to a plan to ask Nyerere to
withdraw the Tanganyikan police from Zanzibar, based on the assumption that, given
their recent difficulties, neither Kenya nor Uganda would be willing to replace them
and thus Karume might be forced to rely on British help.51 This plan had some rather
obvious drawbacks and it was not pursued. Other options were investigated. On 30
January the Commanders Committee East Africa issued instructions for a military
operation codenamed Parthenon designed to restore law and order in Zanzibar.
16
Parthenon was based on the fear that the Umma party, backed by Okello, was
planning to oust moderate members of the government. It went far beyond earlier
plans limited to the protection of European lives and catered for the seizure of first
Unguja and then Pemba by parachute troops and helicopter assault. Forces allocated
included a maximum of two aircraft carriers, three destroyers, the survey ship HMS
Owen, 13 helicopters, 21 transport and reconnaissance aircraft, the 2nd Battalion Scots
Guards, No.45 Commando, one company from the 2nd Battalion, The Parachute
Regiment and a tactical headquarters.52 If the operation had gone ahead it would have
been the largest British airborne/amphibious operation since Suez in 1956.
Fortunately the expected coup did not occur and the situation in Zanzibar did
not deteriorate to the extent feared. Okello’s violent conduct and rhetoric, and that of
his supporters, threatened and alienated more moderate opinion within the Afro-
Shirazi Party. It also removed any chance of his gaining support from the
governments of Tanganyika, Kenya or Uganda. He suffered the disadvantage of being
a Christian and of speaking with a thick mainland accent, marking him out as
something of an outsider in Muslim Zanzibar. He had armed support but little political
backing. In the event it proved relatively easy to remove him. By March forces loyal
to Karume had disarmed many of his supporters. That month Okello took a trip to the
mainland and when he tried to return, on 9 March, he was met by an armed party at
the airport and deported first to Tanganyika and then Kenya. His reputation was
sufficiently sullied to ensure that he was unwelcome in both of these countries and
thus he returned to Uganda, apparently destitute.53 By April it was reported that the
Freedom Military Force was in the process of being disarmed by a newly formed
People’s Liberation Army.54
17
Despite the removal of Okello the British continued to plan for intervention
while remaining aware of the political ramifications of their actions. It was clear that
intervention beyond that required to protect British lives would be problematic unless
it had the support of African leaders. Duncan Sandys visited East Africa in March,
meeting both Karume and Babu on 8 March, coming away with the impression that
the latter was ‘an engaging rogue’.55 There was some hope that the East African
governments might be persuaded to request British intervention or perhaps even to get
Karume to request British intervention to counterbalance the growing communist
influence in Zanzibar. On 12 March Sandys told the Cabinet that the governments of
Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika had been informed that, should they be ‘disposed to
appeal to us for help in restoring order’ in the event of further disturbances in
Zanzibar, Britain would be ‘prepared to consider such a request’.56 No such request
was received. The British thus had the means to intervene but, in the absence of
serious disorder, lacked an acceptable pretext.
In a television interview on 20 February the British Prime Minister, Sir Alec
Douglas-Home, had expressed concern about the number of communist trained agents
in East Africa.57 London became increasingly concerned that Zanzibar would fall to a
pro-communist coup and feared that it was already falling under the influence of the
Sino-Soviet bloc. The arrival of numerous advisers from the Soviet Union, East
Germany and China seemed to confirm this.58 Operation Parthenon was replaced by
Operation Boris and later Operation Finery, each designed to provide for intervention
in Zanzibar using a different mix of military forces.59 Boris was to be mounted from
Kenya using parachute troops. This was problematic. It was recognised that any
18
intervention in Zanzibar would engender a ‘strong adverse reaction’ in Kenya.
Furthermore, the Kenyan government had made it clear that the blanket clearance for
movements of British forces in Kenya did not extend to Zanzibar.60 On 9 April the
Defence Council decided that security could not be preserved in Kenya and thus
Zanzibar forces could be alerted to the mounting of any operation. Operation Finery
was based upon a helicopter landing by marines from the commando ship HMS
Bulwark. This new plan did not require bases in Kenya although, as Bulwark was
required for operations in the Far East, Finery would take 14 days to mount.61 In
addition to the above, the British continued to plan for ‘a life saving operation at 24
hours notice’ to evacuate remaining personnel from Zanzibar without government
consent should the need arise.62
IV
In April 1964 Presidents Nyerere and Karume agreed to a constitutional merger of
their two countries. This decision, announced on 23 April, created the Republic of
Tanganyika and Zanzibar, later renamed the United Republic of Tanzania. Precise
reasons for the union are unclear, but it appears that Karume sought to reinforce his
position in Zanzibar, fearing that Umma and radical elements of the Afro-Shirazi
Party would dominate the government and that this could lead to disorder. Likewise
Nyerere sought a means to bring stability to Zanzibar and to unite two countries that
had close historic links.63 Nyerere became President of the Union and Karume was
made one of its two vice-presidents. Even after the union Zanzibar politics remained
radical and subject to relatively little control from the mainland.64
19
The British feared that opposition to the union, led by Babu, might lead to
civil war between his supporters and those of Karume. In order to support Karume in
the event of any fighting the British commanders in Kenya prepared Operation Shed,
a plan to airlift a battalion of troops and some scout cars to Unguja. The force would
seize the airport and vital points, disarm any opposition, protect British lives and
protect the life of Karume and loyal members of his government.65 Fortunately, once
again, the immediate danger passed without incident and by 29 April Ministers had
decided that forces devoted to Shed could be relaxed to 24 hours notice and that there
was no longer any requirement for Finery.66
The British sought to support the union as a means of promoting stability and
reducing communist influence. The Commonwealth Relations Office contemplated
the pre-emptive deployment of Nigerian troops to Zanzibar to bolster pro-union
elements there.67 Unfortunately, by May it was recognised that the Nigerian
government would not allow their troops to be used in this fashion.68 There was no
alternative to reliance on British forces. Shed had been based on the assumption that
the arrival of British troops in Zanzibar would be unopposed and at Karume’s
invitation. On 21 May the British Chiefs of Staff agreed that these assumptions were
no longer valid.69 In view of the difficulty that union officials had in exerting control
in Zanzibar planning was now based upon the idea that military operations might now
be conducted at the request of President Nyerere in order to support Tanzanian Police
in any clash with Zanzibar security forces. On 9 June the Minister of Defence, Peter
Thorneycroft, reported that current plans were based on the use of a Commando unit
from Aden embarked on the aircraft carrier HMS Centaur and supported by a followon
battalion from Kenya. Intelligence reports suggested that Zanzibar security forces
20
outnumbered the Tanzanian Police and that the People’s Liberation Army and a
Soviet training team were deployed nightly in the vicinity of the airfield. Thorneycroft
noted that any intervention would probably both incur and inflict heavy casualties and
would be resented by the African majority. 70
By August there was growing unhappiness within the State Department about
a perceived failure of the British to take decisive action. The British ambassador in
Washington reported that the Americans were losing confidence in a policy which
was seen as ‘not only defeatist but complacently so’. He noted that the positive
impression gained by the January interventions had now been ‘frittered away’.71 The
British position was rather more cautious than the State Department would have
wished. This was inevitable. It would be British and not American troops who would
be called on to undertake any military operation and thus it was the British and not the
American government that would suffer any adverse consequences. The Foreign
Office felt that the Americans over-estimated Britain’s ability to influence the
situation in East Africa. They, like their American counterparts, saw the value in
getting the East African governments to request British intervention but they were
rather more conscious of the difficulties in actually achieving this.72 The British
position was also rather less alarmist than the American one. The Americans tended to
view the ‘loss’ of Zanzibar to communism as being disastrous for the future stability
of East and Southern Africa. The latter may have been mentioned in order to awaken
Britain to the potential impact of a communist Zanzibar on the increasingly difficult
situation in Rhodesia. The government was sensitive to such issues and the events in
Zanzibar were cited as one reason for treading very carefully over the future of
Southern Rhodesia.73 Nevertheless, whilst sharing some of the American concerns,
21
the British also recognised the difficulties facing communist attempts to infiltrate the
region. There was an appreciation that a communist take-over in Zanzibar might
actually lead to a hardening of attitudes against communism on the mainland. There
was also an understanding that Sino-Soviet rivalry might hinder the development of a
united communist front.74 Whatever the case, military intervention in Zanzibar was
unlikely to improve the situation in the long-term unless it proved acceptable to local
opinion. Unfortunately Britain’s position in East Africa was compromised to a degree
by the colonial legacy. African leaders could not afford to be seen to be too close to
the British for fear of criticism from other African states or from elements within their
own countries. This was apparent in the highly politicised issue of British training and
defence assistance to Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika, it was also reflected in
Britain’s circumspection over Zanzibar.75
British military planning was constrained by a variety of factors, both political
and military. Only eight years after the debacle at Suez, the British were acutely
aware of the need to maintain domestic and international support for any intervention.
According to the Chiefs of Staff, the United States Government was aware of and
supported British readiness to intervene but they acknowledged that such action was
bound to lead to a ‘severely hostile reaction’ in some parts of the world. There was a
realisation that military action would lead to criticism in the United Nations, and that
such criticism could be expected from non-aligned and even some allied countries. In
order to limit this, active operations would need to be completed very quickly,
preferably within 24 hours. The bedrock of the British position was that intervention
could only be justified if it was in response to a request by local African leaders.
Unfortunately, by June it was appreciated that Karume was highly unlikely to invite
22
the British to intervene in the case of instability in Zanzibar. It was also understood
that Nyerere would only turn to the British for help as a last resort and that he would
prefer to rely on African forces. As such, any request for intervention would probably
be issued reluctantly and at the last minute. There was also a fear that, if intervention
did not occur immediately after a request was issued, Nyerere might suffer a crisis of
confidence and withdraw the request before military action could be completed.76
Given these constraints it was important that British forces should be able to
complete operations quickly, effectively and with minimum casualties to all parties.
Unfortunately, potential opposition in Zanzibar had grown since January. By June the
People’s Liberation Army was estimated to be between 500 and 600 strong. It was
supported by a small Soviet military mission and was equipped with a number of
heavy weapons, including light anti-aircraft guns, heavy machine guns, 120-mm
mortars and 57-mm anti-tank guns. The loyalty of the Army was uncertain but they
were considered highly likely to oppose military action by British or mainland forces.
The Zanzibar police numbered around 600 and were loyal to Karume. They could be
expected to support the army in attempting to repulse a British invasion unless
instructed otherwise by Karume. There were also 300 Tanzanian police who it was
assumed would be instructed to help British forces reacting to a request from Nyerere.
Although armed with automatic weapons these police were not considered strong
enough to be relied upon as a major factor in any assault plan. Crosthwait considered
that it was unlikely that British military intervention would be supported by any of the
local population except Asians. The majority of the local African population was
loyal to Karume and would be hostile to British intervention if it did not have his
public backing. To make matters worse, there were still 87 ‘European British’ and a
23
further 40 ‘friendly nationals’ living in Zanzibar. In the event of military intervention
their lives might be endangered by mob violence or the actions of the Zanzibar
security forces.77
The quickest means of inserting troops into Zanzibar would be by air. Army
forces held the airfield and anti-aircraft guns were moved to the area at night to
counter the threat of a night landing. This ruled out a conventional landing by infantry
embarked in aircraft. An airborne assault using the parachute battalion currently based
in Bahrain was possible but the Chiefs of Staff ruled this out as ‘the least tactically
satisfactory method’ of conducting the operation. The only suitable drop-zone for the
troops was 10 miles southeast of Zanzibar Town and seven miles from the airfield.
There would therefore be some delay before key objectives could be taken and British
civilians protected. There was the additional problem that the transport aircraft would
have to stage through Nairobi. It was accepted that in these circumstances there was a
high chance that security would be compromised and that sympathisers on the
mainland would provide Zanzibar with forewarning of the assault. Similar problems
attended the provision of air cover from airfields in Kenya. The favoured approach
was therefore for an amphibious operation utilising landing craft and helicopters from
a commando ship and with air cover provided by an aircraft carrier. In addition to
headquarters elements, a commando unit and two companies of infantry would
provide the assault element, with the remainder of the infantry battalion and
supporting elements arriving by air once the airfield had been secured. The necessary
forces would come from the Far East and Aden and would not depend on troops or
facilities on African soil. This approach was enshrined in the final plan for large-scale
intervention, codenamed Giralda.78
24
The use of maritime forces removed the security issue associated with
mainland Africa and provided for a more satisfactory approach tactically. In order to
disguise British intent it was planned to fly the necessary infantry battalion and
tactical headquarters from Aden to the Indian Ocean island of Gan where they could
join the commando unit and Royal Navy shipping en route to Zanzibar from the Far
East. It would take the whole force 11-15 days to be in position off Zanzibar.
Thereafter it could poise out of sight offshore for another 15 days before the
operational efficiency of the embarked troops would begin to deteriorate to an
unacceptable level. This posed a problem for the British. If they waited for Nyerere to
issue a request for intervention it would take between 11 and 15 days before an
assault could be conducted, providing plenty of time for the President’s resolve to
weaken. On the other hand, if the maritime force sailed early in order to be in position
for rapid intervention there were a finite number of days before the troops would have
to be disembarked, with attendant publicity. Thus sailing before a request had been
issued was rather risky. Unfortunately for the British, with major commitments in
both Aden and the Far East, they did not have sufficient resources to hold a force
permanently in theatre and rotate the necessary amphibious ships and troops offshore.
Naval planners had advocated just such a capability in 1961 when the strategy paper
‘British Strategy in the 1960s’ was being discussed, but it had been ruled out on the
grounds of cost.79
One additional weakness of this approach was that follow-on forces designed
to reinforce the initial assault were to come from Kenya or from Aden via Kenya or
mainland Tanzania. This movement would occur after the initial assault and so would
25
not prejudice surprise, but it was recognised to be vulnerable to changing political
circumstances and the movement might be frustrated by sudden political decisions
over which the British would have little control. Similar problems had almost
unhinged the British reinforcement of Kuwait in 1961.80 It was recognised that as any
delay in the arrival of follow-on forces would undermine the implementation of the
whole operation the plan would require the full co-operation of the Kenyan or
Tanzanian authorities. Support from the latter might be expected if British troops had
been asked to intervene by President Nyerere, support from the former might be more
problematic, particularly after the planned withdrawal of British forces stationed
there.
In the event the plan was never tested. By autumn western interests in
Zanzibar had been all-but eradicated and eastern-bloc influence was paramount.
London saw this as undesirable, but recognised that it did not provide a reason to
intervene. In October 1964, after nine months of contingency planning and changing
readiness states, the government informed the Chiefs of Staff that President Nyerere
was very unlikely to request British military assistance. Therefore Plan Giralda could
be regarded as ‘in suspense’.81 The British general election that month brought to
power a new Labour administration and plans to intervene in Zanzibar were not
resurrected. In December it was finally agreed to scrap Giralda. The government
considered informing Nyerere that the UK no longer felt itself bound to consider
giving him military support over Zanzibar, but eventually decided not to ‘volunteer’
the information.82 There would be no British military intervention in Zanzibar.
V
26
The revolution in Zanzibar illustrated some of the difficulties and dilemmas facing
Britain as it withdrew from empire. The constitutional structure established prior to
independence did not resolve the basic social, political and economic problems facing
Zanzibar. African resentment towards the privileged position held by Arabs before
independence was exacerbated by the result of the 1963 election and by the
subsequent actions of the new government. Prior to independence the British
recognised the potential for unrest in independent Zanzibar and foresaw the
possibility of an increase in communist activity. They would not, however, agree to
the use of British troops for internal security purposes once authority had been
transferred. After the event they recognised that the January revolution was an
‘expression of African resentment at their continued subjection’ rather than an
organised communist coup. Any attempt to restore the Sultan’s government would
have united African opinion against the British and this course of action was not
contemplated. Initial concern about the safety of British nationals in Zanzibar was not
matched by a belief that the British would be justified in using force to protect the
Arab minority in Zanzibar. In the months after the revolution the British were
concerned first by the threat to stability posed by Okello and his supporters and then
by a fear that the new regime was increasingly susceptible to communist influence. A
variety of plans for military intervention were devised but none were enacted. In the
absence of serious disorder in Zanzibar, and aware of the difficulty of gaining
international approval for any unilateral action, the government were forced to accept
that diplomacy had failed and that military intervention was not an option. As a result,
in the opinion of the outgoing High Commissioner, British influence in Zanzibar was
‘virtually eliminated’. British advisers were replaced by those from the communist
bloc and of the 130 British officials employed by the Zanzibar government prior to
27
the revolution only one, a dentist, remained by July.83 This was seen as undesirable,
but did not directly affect any vital British interest. The British government was less
alarmed about the impact of a left-wing regime in Zanzibar than was Washington, and
was more cognisant of the potential perils of military intervention. The latter could
only be effective if it proved acceptable to African opinion within the islands and on
the mainland. The British ability to recognise this and to act or, rather, not to act
accordingly reflects a degree of realism in their approach to post-colonial East Africa.
It is clear that gunboat diplomacy was rather more difficult in 1964 than it had been in
1896.
--------
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Bienen, Henry. Tanzania. Part Transformation and Economic Development ,
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970.
Blyth, Robert. The Empire of the Raj. India, Eastern Africa and the Middle East,
1858-1947, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
Brown, Judith. M. and Louis, Wm. Roger. (eds.), The Oxford History of the British
Empire. Volume IV. The Twentieth Century, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1999.
Cable, James. Gunboat Diplomacy 1919-1979. Political Applications of Limited
Naval Force, London: Macmillan, 1981.
Clayton, Anthony. The Zanzibar Revolution and its Aftermath, Hamden, Connecticut:
Archon Books, 1981.
Darby, Phillip. British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947-1968, London: Oxford
28
University Press, 1974.
Davidson, Basil. Modern Africa. A Social and Political History, London: Pearson
Education Ltd, 1994.
Dockrill, Saki. Britain’s Retreat from East of Suez. The Choice between Europe and
the World, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.
Kennedy, Greg. (ed), British Naval Strategy East of Suez, 1900-2000. Influences and
Actions, London: Frank Cass, 2005.
Kyle, Keith, “Gideon’s Voices.” The Spectator, 7 Feb 1964.
Kyle, Keith, “How it happened.” The Spectator, 14 Feb 1964.
Lofchie, Michael. Zanzibar. Background to Revolution, Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1965.
Lonsdale, John. “East Africa.” in The Oxford History of the British Empire. Volume
IV. The Twentieth Century, edited by Judith Brown and Wm. Roger Louis,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Louis, Wm. Roger . “The Dissolution of the British Empire.” in The Oxford History
of the British Empire. Volume IV. The Twentieth Century, edited by Judith
Brown and Wm. Roger Louis, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Low, D.A. The Eclipse of Empire, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
Mapuri, Omer R. The 1964 Revolution: Achievements and Prospects, Dar es Salaam:
TEMA Publishers, 1996.
Peterson, Don. Revolution in Zanzibar. An American’s Cold War Tale, Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 2002.
Pickering, Jeffrey. Britain’s Withdrawal from East of Suez. The Politics of
Retrenchment, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998.
Okello, John. Revolution in Zanzibar, Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967.
29
Speller, Ian. “The Royal Navy, expeditionary operations and the end of empire, 1956-
1975.” in. British Naval Strategy East of Suez, 1900-2000. Influences and
Actions, edited by Greg Kennedy. London: Frank Cass, 2005.
Speller, Ian. “Naval diplomacy: Operation Vantage, 1961.” in The Royal Navy and
Maritime Power in the Twentieth Century, edited by Ian Speller, London:
Frank Cass, 2005.
Stevens, Lt. Col. T. “A Joint Operation in Tanganyika.” The Royal United Service
Institution Journal, 110, no. 637, Feb. 1965.
Tanzania People’s Defence Forces, Tanganyika Rifles Mutiny. January 1964, Dar es
Salaam: Dar es Salaam University Press, 1993.
Yeager, Rodger. Tanzania. An African Experiment, Boulder: Westview Press, 1982.
Young, Kenneth. Sir Alex Douglas-Home, London: Dent and Sons, 1970.
1 Darby, British Defence Policy, 238.
2 Pickering, Britain’s Withdrawal from East of Suez, Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat from East of Suez, 35.
3 Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy, 57.
4 See Clayton, Zanzibar Revolution. Lofchie, Zanzibar.. Peterson, Revolution in Zanzibar. Peterson
was the US Vice-Consul in Zanzibar at the time of the revolution. Also see Kyle, Keith. ‘Gideon’s
Voices’, The Spectator, 7 Feb. 1964 and ‘How it happened’, The Spectator, 14 Feb. 1964.
5 For example, see Low, Eclipse of Empire, chapters 7 and 9, and Lonsdale, “East Africa” in Brown,
and Louis, (eds.), The Oxford History of the British Empire Vol. IV.
6 See Lofchie, Zanzibar, chapter 1. For a discussion of India’s influence on Zanzibar in the nineteenth
century see Blyth, The Empire of the Raj, esp. chapter 3.
7 Lonsdale, “East Africa”, 531-533.
8 Mapuri, The 1964 Revolution, 20.
9 Peterson, Revolution in Zanzibar, .10. Davidson, Modern Africa, 146.
10 Low, Eclipse of Empire, 244.
30
11 For a discussion of such issues within a broad context see Louis, Wm. Roger . “The Dissolution of
the British Empire”, in Brown and Louis (eds.), The Oxford History of the British Empire Vol. IV,
chapter 14.
12 The Zanzibar and Pemba People’s Party membership was predominantly African and was
particularly strong in Pemba where the African and Arab communities lived in greater harmony than on
Unguja.
13 Clayton, Zanzibar Revolution, chapter 3.
14 . Telegram from Sir George Mooring (British Resident in Zanzibar) to the Secretary of State for the
Colonies, 21 Nov. 1963 and Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Sir George
Mooring, 9 Dec. 1963, CAB 21/5524, The UK National Archives, Kew (henceforth TNA).
15 For example, see, Subversive Activity in Zanzibar, Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee, 29
Aug 1963, JIC (63) 61, CAB 158/49.
16 The ‘official’ version of events was published in The Nationalist in Dar es Salaam on 12 Jan. 1965. It
is reproduced as an appendix in Okello, Revolution in Zanzibar.
17 For further details see Clayton, Zanzibar Revolution, chapter 3.
18 In Feb. 1964 the British High Commissioner estimated that ‘…not less than 1,000 and possibly
considerably more were murdered.’ Casualties and Refugees Resulting from Zanzibar Revolution,
DO185/60, TNA. Clayton suggests that 8,000 people were killed whereas Peterson estimates that the
death toll amongst Arabs was around 5,000. The latter figure would represent roughly ten percent of
the Arab population of Zanzibar. This remains a sensitive issue in Zanzibar, see Mapuri, The 1964
Revolution, 1, 2, 55.
19 Babu later claimed that Umma intervened at the crucial moment to transform a simple rebellion into
a revolutionary insurrection, Mapuri, The 1964 Revolution, 2. For the British view on this matter see,
JIC (64) 11th meeting, 27 Feb. 1964, CAB 159/40.
20 Telegram No.186, Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) to the High Commissioner, Dar es
Salaam, 25 Jan. 1964, DO 181/51.
21 An Outline History of Events in East Africa during the period 12th to the 26th January, 64, WO
276/373, TNA.
22 Ibid.
31
23 HMS Owen. Diary of Events, 12th –17th January, 20 Jan. 1964, ADM 1/29063, TNA. Commanding
Officer, HMS Owen’s letter No. 3/1642, 1 Feb. 1964, ADM 1/129063.
24 HMS Owen. Diary of Events, 12th-17th January.
25 An Outline History of Events in East Africa.
26 Clayton, Zanzibar Revolution, 87.
27 HMS Owen. Diary of Events, 12th-17th January.
28 For further details see Stevens, Lt. Col. T. “A Joint Operation in Tanganyika”, 48-55 and ADM
1/29063. Also see Tanzania People’s Defence Forces, Tanganyika Rifles Mutiny..
29 For example see United Kingdom. Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., vol. 688., cols. 513-514,
534-535, and 975-978.
30 Captain Steiner, Report to Flag Officer Middle East, 5 Feb. 1964, ADM 1/29063. 45 Commando
Royal Marines. Preliminary Report on Operations in Tanganyika, 8 Feb. 1964, ADM 1/29063.
31 Report on the Activities of 41 Commando, Royal Marines, 1st January 1964 – 10th April 1964, ADM
202/510.
32 Bienen, Tanzania, 367.
33 An Outline History of Events in East Africa.
34 ADM 202/510, Report on the Activities of 41 Commando, Royal Marines, 1st January 1964 – 10th
April 1964. Annex B.
35 DO (64) 4th meeting, item 1, 28 Jan. 1964, CAB 148/1 and DO (64) 13th meeting, item 1, 11 March
1964, CAB 148/1.
36 Pros and Cons of Military Intervention in Zanzibar, 3 Feb. 1964, CAB 21/5524. DO (64) 9, The
Policy Implications of Developments in East Africa, 4 Feb. 1964, CAB 148/1.
37 DO (64) 17th meeting, 8 April 1964, CAB 148/1. United Kingdom. Hansard Parliamentary Debates,
5th ser., vol. 687, cols. 37-38 and vol. 688., cols. 513-514, 534-535, and 975-978.
38 See FO 371/176514, TNA for a discussion of the pros and cons of recognition.
39 Both the US State Department and the UK Foreign Office were concerned that the delay in offering
recognition had undermined western interests in Zanzibar. The Americans were reported to be
‘seriously disturbed’ by Crosthwait’s handling of the situation whilst at the Foreign Office in London
Sir Geoffrey Harrison complained about the inefficiency of the CRO and about the ‘procrastination’ of
Sandys. For further details see FO 371/176514 and FO 371/ 176601.
32
40 Mr T. L. Crosthwait, Zanzibar: Mr T.L. Crosthwait’s Valedictory Despatch, 22 July 1964, PREM
11/5208, TNA.
41 Telegram No.503, CRO to Zanzibar, 29 Jan. 1964, DO 213/130.
42 Peterson, Revolution in Zanzibar, 126-130.
43 Note of a meeting on Zanzibar, 1 Feb. 1964, DO 231/130.
44 Peterson, Revolution in Zanzibar, 130.
45 Telegram No. 4487, Foreign Office to Washington, 30 March 1964, CAB 21/5524.
46 Telegram No. 4488, Foreign Office to Washington, 30 March 1964, CAB 21.5524.
47 HMS Owen. Diary of Events, 12th-17th January.
48 Ibid.
49 HMS Rhyl. Report of Proceedings.
50 Zanzibar to Commonwealth Secretary, 23 Jan. 1964, DO 213/130.
51 DO 213/130. Telegram No.186, CRO to the High Commissioner, Dar es Salaam, 25 Jan. 1964, DO
185/51.
52 Restoration of Law and Order in Zanzibar. Operation Instruction No.1, 30 Jan. 1964, WO 276/372.
53 Okello subsequently spent time in prison in both Kenya and Uganda, taking the opportunity to write
his own account of the revolution. He was last seen in the company of Idi Amin in 1971, after which he
disappeared. Peterson, Revolution in Zanzibar, 177.
54 DO 185/64, Political Situation in Zanzibar, 1 Jan 1964 – 31 Dec 1964.
55 FO 371/176601, US/UK Relations: Zanzibar. Notes on visit of Sandys to Zanzibar, March 1964.
56 CM (64) 18th Conclusions, 12 March 1964, CAB 128/28 pt2.
57 Young, Sir Alex Douglas-Home, 198-199.
58 CM (64) 21st Conclusions, 9 April 1964, CAB 128/38 pt 2.
59 JPS (MIDEAST) Outline Plan for Intervention in Zanzibar, 17 April 1964, WO 276/370.
60 Cypher No. 277, Nairobi to Dar es Salaam, 3 Feb. 1964, DO 213/130
61 Note from Minister of Defence to Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 9 June 1964,
PREM 11/5208.
62 Telegram No.936, CRO to Dar es Salaam, 20 May 1964, DO 185/51.
63 The State Department had already concluded that some form of federation might provide a useful
means of reducing radicalism in Zanzibar but recognised that they (and the British) could not be seen
33
to be taking the initiative on such an issue. Telegram No. 920, Washington to the Foreign Office, 6
March 1964, CAB 21/5524.
64 See Yeager, Tanzania, and Davidson, Modern Africa, chapter 14.
65 Joint Operations Instruction No. 2/64. Op Shed, 25 April 1964, WO 276/370.
66 COSMID 147, 29 April 1964, WO 276/370.
67 Nigerian troops were already stationed in mainland Tanzania, having replaced the Royal Marines in
the aftermath of the army mutiny in January.
68 Internal Security and the Possibility of Military Intervention in Zanzibar, DO 185/51.
69 COS 182/64, Operations in East Africa, 17 June 1964, DEFE 5/152, TNA.
70 Note from Minister of Defence to Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 9 June 1964,
PREM 11/5208.
71 Note from Denis Greenhill to Sir Geoffrey Harrison, 7 Aug. 1964, FO 371/176524,
72 Ibid. Sir G. Harrison to D.A. Greenhill, 18 Aug. 1964., FO 371/176524.
73 For further details see PREM 11/5047.
74 JIC (64) 57, Soviet and Chinese Motivations for their Activities in Africa. Report by the Joint
Intelligence Committee, 2 July 1964, CAB 158/53.
75 For example see DO (64) 13th meeting item 1, 11 March 1964, CAB 148/1.
76 COS 182/64., Telegram No. 3579, Foreign Office to Washington, 3 July 1964, PREM 11/5208.
77 COS 182/64
78 COS 60th meeting 1964, 23 Sept. 1964, DEFE 4/175. COS 274/64, Intervention in Zanzibar, 9 Oct.
1964, DEFE 5/154.
79 For further details see Speller, “The Royal Navy”, 178-198.
80 Speller, “Naval diplomacy”, 164-180.
81 COS 274/64, Intervention in Zanzibar, 9 Oct. 1964, DEFE 5/154.
82 COS 73rd Meeting 1964, 15 Dec 1964, DEFE 4/178. Letter from the CRO to the High
Commissioner, Dar es Salaam, 31 Dec. 1964, and letter from the High Commissioner, Dar es Salaam to
the CRO, 3 Feb. 1965, DO 185/51.
83 Mr T. L. Crosthwait, Zanzibar: Mr T.L. Crosthwait’s Valedictory Despatch, 22 July 1964, PREM
11/5208.
34
35
Messages in this topic (1)
